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Interview with: Bert H. Tunks
Interviewed by: Louis Marchiafava
Date: May 23, 1975
Archive Number: OH182
I: 00:04 Judge Tunks, I’d like to begin by asking you a few questions about your background. How did you become involved in the study of law?
BT: It’s been an ambition of mine since I was—since I can remember as a small child to be a lawyer. As a matter of fact, I was raised as a child in the town of Durant, Oklahoma where a lawyer—whom I did not know except that he was a lawyer—was sort of my ideal. And there were a few members of my family from Kentucky that had been lawyers that led me into personal interest in the law. I originally went to college at the school in Stillwater, Oklahoma that is now known as Oklahoma State, I believe. Then it was known as Oklahoma A&M. At that time, the course I took was general but I had the idea in mind that at a later date going to school and studying law. That was during the Depression. My plans were delayed considerably. I stayed—I went to school there for a couple of years and then was out of school about 9 years, during which time I worked for the Continental Oil Company on the seismograph crew in various parts of the western part of the United States. February of 1938 I went to—entered the law school or entered school rather—academic school—at Texas University. Then in the summer of ’38 I entered law school at Texas University and graduated in August of ‘40 after having gone the full year round—summer and winter. In ’41 I came to Houston to start practicing law with a private firm here. Shortly after that, I became associated with an established lawyer here, Mr. J. S. Bracewell. And after a brief service in the Army, I returned to Houston and he and I—J. S. Bracewell and I—and his 2 sons organized a partnership for the practice of law. The firm was then known as Bracewell and Tunks and is now known as Bracewell and Patterson. And the type of practice we did in the firm was of a general nature. Primarily my function of the firm was handling the trial of cases in the courthouse. Our practice was quite general involving all types of cases of a civil nature and very few of a criminal nature. The most notorious case in which I participated as an attorney for that firm was the case of Delores Ross versus Houston Independent School District, which was the first segregation case filed in Houston following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Brown versus Topeka. That case theoretically is still pending in the Federal Court here in Harris County, and it is pursuant to the orders growing out of that case that the integration program is being conducted in the Houston Independent School District at this time. In that case I was attorney for the Houston Independent School Distinct. And July 1, 1957, I was appointed to the Civil District Court in Harris County by Governor Price Daniel. I continued to serve on the Civil District Court in Harris County until September 1, 1967 when the Fourteenth Court of Civil Appeals was created. At that time, I was appointed Chief Justice of the Fourteenth Court of Civil Appeals by Governor Connally. Since that time, I have continued to occupy that position having submitted myself to the election on, I believe, 2 different occasions up to this time.
I: 04:59 I’d like to go back and ask you for a—talk to you for a few moments about your appointment as Governor Price Daniels appointed you. How did you happen to get into the circles of Governor Daniel’s?
BT: Well, in so far as judicial appointments are concerned, where a vacancy occurs the governor appoints someone to hold that vacancy until the next general election. In so far as judicial appointments are concerned, usually the governor is controlled by the sentiments of the local bars association of the local lawyers. Having a good standing within the local bar and having the support of the local bar is calculated to be productive of an appointment to the judicial positions. I did not personally know or was not a personal friend of Governor Daniel. I knew him of course, knew of him, but I could not have been called a personal friend of his. It was only by virtue of the influence of the local attorneys that I was—and their recommendation that I was appointed first by Governor Daniel, and the same is true of the appointment to this court by Governor Connally in 1967.
I: Did the desegregation case assist you in publicity or—?
BT: Not at all. In so far as appointment is concerned it certainly did not. In fact, I doubt if Governor Daniel—he might have known that I had participated in it, but so far as I know he did not.
I: While were talking in the area of the desegregation case, I’d like to ask you—the defense that HISD took at that time to maintain segregation, has it—you mentioned before, that’s still pending in court.
BT: I’m not sure that it is technically pending. It was a few years ago and I suppose it still is technically pending.
I: The question I wanted to ask is related to that. The validity of the argument that was presented by HISD, how could it stand up to the point where it—well, at least until a couple of years ago it was still on the dockets?
BT: 07:30 Well, the position taken by the Houston Independent School District in the original integration case was not one of defiance of the Supreme Court of the United States in its decision in the Brown versus Topeka. The position taken by the school district was that it was then in the process of integrating the school district and it was acting with sufficient speed and—it contended that it was acting with sufficient speed in carrying out the integration program. We were—produced evidence as to attest to the building of new schools and the area in which they were being built to show that that was calculated to bring about a gradual program of integration without any court order. That was the position that the school district took in that case. We knew at that time the Supreme Court of the United States had already ordered integration and it was futile to declare ourselves in revolt from the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, and we did not take that attitude at all.
I: How long were you involved in that case?
BT: I became involved in it the first in January of 1957 and kept involved in it, of course, until I was appointed to the bench.
I: And how were you selected to represent HISD?
BT: The school board just selected our firm as their general council.
I: I see.
BT: We had previously represented some people in the school district. J. O. Webb(09.15) had a rather bitter controversy with the school board and we were chosen by him to represent him in that controversy. And at the first of January of 1957, the personnel of the school board changed and they were favorable to the position we had taken in representing Mr. Webb—not unanimously, but the majority was favorable.
I: Do you think the position, the defense that you offered, had validity? Do you think it could have held up?
BT: Certainly I think it had validity otherwise I wouldn’t have presented it the judge. And with—although the judge did not subscribe to our view wholeheartedly. As evidenced by the fact that the integration program is still in the course of being carried out, the courts have generally gone, to some extent, along with our position on it.
I: If I may rephrase that and substitute—instead of validity—it was merely a delay in action rather?
BT: No, it was not a delay in action. We took the position that we were acting to accomplish integration and acting with reasonable speed to accomplish it. And had a vast amount of evidence in support of that position too, particularly in connection with our school building program, which was underway then and has subsequently been not only carried out but vastly expanded. Incidentally, I have not maintained a contact with the recent actions of the court having to do with integration.
I: You might say it was then a transition process in the course of integration. Is that what the HISD was really seeking?
BT: 11:08 The position we took that we were in the process of going through a transition from segregation to integration and that we were acting with reasonable speed, which the position was to some extent sustained by the court. An order was entered directing the school to proceed to effectuate integration, and subsequently after I became disassociated with the case, the board was ordered by the judge to present a plan that was calculated to bring about integration. And those things have been done repeatedly since 1957, the full nature of which I haven’t kept up with.
I: There was another interesting case you were involved in, in private practice, dealing with a lawsuit against the city in which a private individual was awarded $50,000, I believe.
BT: Yes that was called the Shilling versus the City of Houston. A lady was injured in an automobile collision, a collision between her automobile and a garbage truck operated and maintained by the city. And of course the doctrine of governmental immunity was applicable and served as a protection to the city from liability for personal injuries that were caused by the city engaging in its governmental activities. We took the position in that case, for which Judge J. S. Bracewell was largely responsible—we took the position in that case that while the collection and disposal of garbage was a governmental function, the maintenance of the garbage trucks, their repair, was a proprietary function and a governmental agency was not—a city—was not exempt from liability for those injuries caused by the caring out of its proprietary functions. And we were able to persuade the courts to accept that theory as for the Shilling case and did recover a substantial amount of damages—in those days at any rate—from the city.
I: Would that be considered a landmark case?
BT: Probably it is, probably it is. Of course it’s no longer significant because of the statutory limitation on exemption of governmental agencies for injuries that they cause and even in the performance of governmental functions. That limitation, brought about by the legislative enactment of the Court Claims Act in Texas, largely eliminates that defense of governmental immunity.
I: 14:04 Were there many other cases that followed after this decision dealing with suits against the city?
BT: Well, when you say many other, there were—
I: A few others?
BT: —from the standpoint of the layman there wouldn’t be many, but from a lawyer’s there were a significant number that followed the precedent established by Shilling versus city of Houston.
I: I’d like to move on to your present position and get some idea of the duties involved.
BT: Well—excuse me. (recording interrupted)
I: For example, are there many important administrative duties as well as duties on the bench?
BT: Well, my primary function is judicial. The Court of Civil Appeals, as it now stands, is an intermediate appellate court having jurisdiction over certain civil matters. Matters that arise in the county court that involve more than $100 in damages and are appealable to this court are—we have jurisdiction over. If they involve less than $1000 in damages we have final jurisdiction over—Supreme Court doesn’t have jurisdiction to review our decisions. The book of our appeals come from several cases decided by the civil district courts—the district courts that exercise civil jurisdiction. Those cases represent probably 90% of those appealed to this court. We review the judgment of the district court and our judgment in those cases—affirming, reversing, modifying, or whatever we may do to the district court’s judgment—are subject to review by the Supreme Court within certain areas. There are certain facets of the appeal, even from the district court, as to which we have final jurisdiction, and there are certain types of cases appealed from the jurisdiction of the district court as to which we have supposedly final jurisdiction, such as divorce cases and please of privilege. Those are just examples. There are several others. As to our basic holdings, they’re subject to review by the Supreme Court, and if we’re found to be wrong, they can make proper disposition of the case either by remanding the case to us for further hearing or remanding the case to the trial court for further hearing or reversing our opinion and affirming the trial court opinion when that’s proper.
17:22 This court—the Fourteenth Court of Civil Appeals—was created on September 1, 1967. Prior to the date that this court was created, there was in existence a Court of Civil Appeals in Houston—the First Court of Civil Appeals. But the litigation was so heavy in that court, as I recall, the last year that it acted as the sole court in this area there were slightly less than 300 cases appealed to it. No one Court of Civil Appeals can handle that many cases in a year. The cases that were excess pending in the First Court of Civil Appeals were, before the creation of this court, assigned out to other courts of civil appeals in different parts of Texas—particularly Waco, Eastland, Texarkana, and Beaumont, and Tyler also. The local bar resisted that transfer of cases because they preferred to try cases before their own judges and for other reasons. It was thought that with or without justification—I don’t know, but I’m just repeating some of the views that I’ve heard from lawyers—that there was a, sort of, specialized concept of a jury trial in Harris County that did not prevail in a more rural county. As an example, a Harris County judge or jury would not be shocked with a substantial judgment, whereas an Eastland appellate court might be inclined to think that what would be recognized as a reasonable substantial judgment here in Harris County was an excessive judgment if they were reviewing it. They thought they ought to have their cases reviewed by a court with the same general type of background as the court in which they tried it originally.
It was to avoid the necessity of those transfers that the Fourteenth Court was created, our territorial jurisdiction being just the same as that of the First Court. Since the date of the creation of the Fourteenth Court up to now, at any rate, there have been very few cases of need for transfer from the 2 local courts of civil of appeals to other courts of civil appeals. When that did occur one time in the past, the attorneys pretty bitterly protested it. The local bar association passed a resolution condemning it. We also resisted it. We were able to show—and the statistics bear us out on this—that we could dispose of the cases quickly in this court as any other court in Texas could—or as quickly in these 2 courts, the First and Fourteenth. So that protest having been lodged with the Supreme Court, they were reluctant to transfer cases from then on, and that passed.
This year for instance, the 2 courts in Harris County—I mean in Houston—I have the statistics here somewhere. There are 14 courts of civil appeals in Texas. The 2 courts of civil appeals in Houston have disposed of 118 cases through the month of April. All 14 courts in the state of Texas has disposed of only 453. The average number of cases disposed of by courts of civil appeals is 32. The Fourteenth Court has disposed of 66, and the First Court has disposed of 52. That is a little bit low for the First Court because just the way cases happen to fall. We had a number of cases that were disposed of during the month of April, and they’ll have a number of cases disposed of during the month of May. We usually are just about even. That was for the purpose—we feel that we are under obligation to the local litigants and lawyers to exercise every effort we can to dispose of our docket and keep it down to where it will not be necessary to transfer cases to other courts of civil appeals that are not so busy. Some of the other courts of civil appeals that do not dispose of as many cases simply do not do it because they don’t have the docket, they don’t have the cases to dispose of. It’s not because they don’t work, they just don’t have anything to work on.
I: 22:35 What have you found to be the major reasons for appeal besides dissatisfaction with the lower courts decision? Are there errors involved or some other factors?
BT: Well, most of the appeals are based on evidentiary questions. I mean the—I don’t mean technicalities of admitting and rejecting evidence, but usually the appellant feels that the evidence shows, as a matter of law, that he should have won. The appellant is nearly always the loser. He takes that position in his appeal, that the evidence shows, as a matter of law, that the trial court entered the wrong judgment. Another similar evidentiary factor in appeal is the position taken by the appellant that the judgment rendered by the trial court, either on the basis of a jury verdict or a decision by the judge if no jury was used is, against the weight of the evidence, that it is so against the weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong. Those 2 grounds are the principal bases of appeals. Aside from that, there are a great number of appeals that involve the construction of contracts, the proper application of statutes that are controlling, or the procedural errors of the trial court in submission of case to the jury, or admitting or excluding evidence. Those are also raised on appeal, but most of the appeals are based on the evidentiary aspect of the case.
I: Do most of the cases involve businesses or corporations?
I: Or is it private individuals?
BT: 24:42 Of course, le me say this: probably 80% of the trials in the trial court involve some facet of personal injury litigation—automobile collisions, products liability, Workmans’ Compensation cases, all of which involved a personal injury of a party. Probably 90% of them in the trial court, of which I have been a member also. The same does not prevail in so far as the appellate court is concerned because the law is comparatively stereotyped and fairly well settled as to personal injury litigation. In the appellate court—Court of Civil Appeals—probably not more than 20% of the appeals involve personal injury types of litigation. Whereas the usual appeal involves the construction of a contract, or suit on a commercial matter, or suit involving the title to land or the probate of a will, or something of that general nature.
I: How long does it take for from the time the case is appealed to the time that you receive it?
BT: Well, that depends on where you begin from.
I: The district court for example?
BT: From the date the judgment is rendered by the district court?
BT: Is that the beginning point?
BT: Well, there too it depends on the nature of the case it is. If it’s one tried before a jury—which is the usual situation—the party that looses has 10 days in which to file his original motion for a new trial. He has 20 days after that in which to file an amended motion for a new trial. Generally speaking, that amended motion for a new trial must be either sustained or overruled in 45 days. There’s some exceptions to these general statements I’m making. So there’s a period of 75 days from the date of the rendition of the judgment. After the motion for a new trial is overruled, if it is overruled—of course, if it’s sustained the case doesn’t come up on appeal, it just goes back for another trial. But if the motion for a new trial is overruled, then—skipping some of the procedural steps—the record is required by rules—the record consists of the transcript and the statement of facts—it’s required by the rules of procedure to be filed in this court in 60 days. For good cause, that time can be extended and usually is in so far as the statement of fact is concerned. But I’m giving you the basic times that elapse. After it reaches this court—say that it is filed within 60 days, then the appellant has 30 days in which to file his appellate brief. And the appellee has 25 days after that in which to file his appellees’ brief. And then by the time that is done, we’re usually ready to hear it within a week or 10 days. Usually our practice has been to be able to give a litigant a hearing just about as soon as he gets his record completed.
I: How much weight does a judge give the oral argument as opposed to the written argument at the end of the trial?
BT: 28:22 It depends on the case, but I will say this: that the oral argument is quite a help to the court in deciding the case. There have been cases—let me give you some examples that will clearly show that. Some years ago the personnel of this court changed. For the month of January, by virtue of the fact that 2 new judges came onto the court, we were unable to hear any cases for the whole month of January. During that month, I picked up some files of cases that were pending and were to be heard during the month of February and wrote 3 tentative opinions before the cases were ever submitted. After the oral argument, I changed the result in 2 of those 3. Now, that’s how much oral argument means. It is quite persuasive with the court because we get a slant of the case that we cannot get from a piece of paper.
I: Using, without names in the cases involved—in the 2 cases that you mentioned, can you give me some idea of what exactly led you to change your—?
BT: I don’t remember the particular cases, I just remember that there were 3 of them and that 2 of them were changed.
I: That’s interesting.
BT: You just get a different view of the case, particularly as to the weight of the evidence, after there’s an oral argument. Also, in oral arguments, you’re able to ask the lawyer some questions about some points that are bothering you and get from those lawyers their suggestions as to the solution of those questions. The judges of this court—and not all courts do it with reason, but the judges of this court always review the briefs before the case is argued orally. And in going over those briefs, questions will arise to us as to what the law should be in a particular area. Then during the oral argument, we’ll ask the lawyers to comment on those questions and sometimes they can give us the most helpful comments on them.
I: 30:36 In handling all—to me, it seems like a tremendous case load to handle hearing these cases. Do you get much help from law clerks, court clerks?
BT: We have 3 law clerks for this court. Three graduate students—3 students that have just graduated from law school—one assigned to each judge. And they are extremely helpful; they do a lot of leg work. For instance, they proofread every opinion that we write. They—if we cite a case that comes out of one of these books over here, they go pull the original case out and see that we’re giving the proper volume and page number and have the names of the parties spelled correctly. They check it against the Shepard Citator to see for sure that it is still the law—has not been changed or overruled. They check it against what we call the Writ of Error Tables to be sure the Supreme Court has not reversed it—if it’s a Court of Civil Appeals case we’re deciding—or some other disposition been made of it to render it no longer authoritative. Those—that type of thing that are purely mechanical are very important and can be done just as well by a briefing clerk as they can be done by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States—probably better by most of the briefing clerks. And another thing the briefing clerks can do, they’re quite helpful in editing. Students that—we get top students out of the law schools. Students coming out of college now are much better grammarians than I am. They are helpful to me in un-splitting some of my split infinitives and moving commas about and otherwise editing the opinion. It’s a real substantial help. And then, of course, the other function they perform that is helpful is extending the research of the case beyond that which is reflected in the briefs of the attorneys. Frequently, the briefing clerks or the judge himself will find authorities in other cases that are persuasive if not controlling of the disposition of the case we’re briefing. The attorneys—some attorneys do an excellent job in that. Even with the best of them though, occasionally they fail to refer to some authority that is persuasive in the case as an authority of an accepted nature in law review or cases from other jurisdictions or federal courts. Those cases are frequently found by the judge himself, even though the lawyers failed to point them out in their briefs. I have in mind one particular case that was quite—they were excellent lawyers in it and thoroughly briefed it, but nevertheless, a case can be researched beyond what they have done. For one thing, the judge, in researching a case, does it objectively, while a lawyer does it as an advocate. That’s the significance of it.
I: 33:56 Do law clerks ever offer suggestions to a judge?
BT: Sure, sure. They’re encouraged to.
I: Are they?
BT: They’re encouraged to. Each of us has one law clerk and when a case is under consideration, brief being written, frequently the law clerk will have written a memorandum summarizing the facts. And the law clerk will have examined the authorities that are cited in the brief and the judge, then in review of the memorandum, will discuss it with the law clerk. Not always do we agree with them, and sometimes they violently disagree with us. But the discussion is quite helpful in helping snake out the case.
I: I’d like to devote just a few moments to your role as chief justice. What influence do you exert over other judges?
BT: None. Each of the judges, in so far as the judging function of the court is concerned, has the same authority as the other judges. Each case is assigned to one particular judge who has the primary responsibility for preparing the opinion on that case. After it is prepared, it is submitted to the other 2 judges for review. If we disagree with it—one of the judges disagrees with the opinion that is submitted for approval, he may write a dissenting opinion. That is not often done in this court. If each—if an opinion is submitted for my consideration and I do not agree either with the overall result or some particular facet of it, I discuss it with the other 2 judges. And in many instances, either I am convinced that I am wrong or the judge who wrote the opinion is convinced that he is wrong, and it’s corrected so as to meet with the approval of all 3 of us. If we cannot resolve our difficulties in that matter, we just dissent. One judge who disagrees with the other 2 will write a dissenting opinion. But that doesn’t happen often. Almost always we’re able to iron out our difficulties. I think I’ve written 2 dissenting opinions in the last year.
I: So when the author of the decision—the original decision is more or less—it stands on its own then, whether you happen to disagree with it or not, is that—?
BT: Well, there have been a number of times within the past year where the author of the original decision has written his opinion, either I or one of the other judges will disagree with it, and after discussion the author will decide that he was wrong and will revise the opinion so that the other 2 agree with it. That has happened more than there have been dissents. But every opinion that comes out of this court is really the opinion of the 3 judges, except those in which there’s a dissenting opinion of course.
I: Are there any other areas as chief justice that you feel there’s a significant authority involved that—?
BT: Well, there are some minor administrative duties, but they are a small, fractional part of the work of this position. For instance, I have to sign the payroll after it’s made up by my clerk.
I: That’s a very important function.
BT: When requests for the purchase of equipment are made, I discuss with the clerk the necessity for it, and if it is necessary I sign an order—an application—to the controller to allow that much money for the purchase of that equipment. For instance, if we need a new typewriter, the clerk informs me that we need it and I don’t always agree. If we do, and I’m convinced that we need, well then, I sign the necessary papers to authorize its purchase. But those are trivial duties.
I: Yeah. One question I’d like to ask you—which perhaps you’re not directly involved with being a state judge not a federal judge—but have you noticed any significant change in or expansion in federalism in dealing with cases? Has the federal law, for example—I don’t want to use the word intruded—but it has it made an impact in the state courts?
BT: 39:01 Very little in so far as civil practice is concerned.
BT: Much more, I understand, in so far as criminal practice is concerned. But we, at this time, do not have any criminal jurisdiction. I might mention, in that regard, that under the proposed amendment to the judicial code of the Constitution, the courts that are now called Courts of Civil Appeals will become intermediate appellate courts called the Courts of Appeals, and will have jurisdiction over criminal appeals as well as civil appeals. If that Constitution amendment is passed this November it will become effective next September the first—September 1, 1976. All cases pending before the Court of Criminal Appeals, over which we would have had jurisdiction, under the amended form of the Constitution will be transferred from the Court of Criminal Appeals to this court. And I understand from the estimates of the local attorney’s office that will be about 500 cases.
I: Can you handle that many cases?
BT: 40:11 No sir. It’s going to be a horrible state of confusion which will require some changes in procedure. What they are, I do not know yet. But I am sure we can adjust to it whatever it is.
I: So, at this time then, the expansion of federalism has not really had an impact on your—?
BT: Very, very little—very little. There are a few areas in which it has. Since this court has been organized, there is one instance in which the decision of this court was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. That was an instance involving labor law in which the Supreme Court had announced a principal in a 5 to 4 decision. The dissenting 4 judges had vigorously protested that the change in the existing law should be made, and subsequently additional judges were appointed to that court and the changes were made. We felt obliged to follow the law as it was then stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, and if they chose to change the law, they had to do it rather than we. They did change the law and reversed our decision.
I: In conclusion, I’d like to—I just have 2 questions I’d like to ask you. First of all, are there any major problems hindering the handling of your cases now? Are there any stumbling blocks that you see that need to be removed in— (both talking at once; unintelligible) —matters?
BT: Well, the major problem that I foresee, in addition to this transfer of cases from the Court of Criminal Appeals to this court in the event of the adoption of the section 5 of the Constitution, is housing. This court has been plagued with housing problems ever since we were created. We’re very well established now and we have had the best of cooperation from the Commissioners Court. The Commissioners Court in Harris County probably treats the Courts of Civil Appeals in Houston better than the Commissioners Court in any other county in which courts of appeals is located. But they’re faced with a problem themselves, there just is not going to be available housing that will adequately serve the Court of Civil Appeals as it will almost certainly have to be expanded under the Constitution if it is amended. If there is an amendment, the 2 courts—the First Court and the Fourteenth Court—will become one court. And the Constitution, as proposed, will provide for 3 or more judges on each Court of Civil Appeals. In order to handle this load that I was telling you about—criminal cases—it will probably be necessary that there be many more than 6 judges on the Court of Civil Appeals. There will probably have to be from 9 to 15. I don’t know how many they’ll be. You can see the housing problems that are created by 9 judges, 9 briefing clerks, and additional secretaries, and so forth—the solution to which I cannot now see. It’s a problem we’ll just have to work out. How we’ll do it I don’t know, but it can be done.
I: I see potentially another problem and that is simply appointing judges to these positions. Do you see any—do have any ideas on how the system of appointments can be improved?
BT: 44:02 I think the system of appointments works very well. As I say, it largely depends upon the standing of a lawyer within the—or another judge—with the local bar as to whether he’s a capable lawyer, an honest lawyer, or a capable and honest judge. Incidentally, there’s not a judge that I know of, in Harris County, as to whom I would have the slightest question as to his 100% honesty. There are occasionally some questions as to his ability to decide the law, but I don’t know of any instance in which a legitimate complaint can be made against a judge in so far as his honesty and integrity is concerned in this area.
I: In conclusion, are there any areas that perhaps you’d like to address yourself to that I haven’t brought up in our discussions?
BT: I think not. I think we’ve pretty generally covered what I understood that you wanted to cover.
I: On behalf of the Houston Metropolitan Archives and Research Center, I certainly want to thank you for taking the time to talk with me and provide some information that will be of use to researchers in the future.
BT: 45:20 Okay. Thank you. Glad to do it.